probabilities a priori times their likelihoods as a function of E (all this holding in the interior of system K). The We will show how BAYES formula provides logical rules for choosing one B i over all possible B i , or among those whose consequences can be formulated; further, it will be shown how the rules adopted in practice cannot have a logical justification outside of the light of this formula.
THE RULE OF THE MOST PROBABLE HYPOTHESIS
We shall begin a critical discussion of the methods proposed by FISHER's school by posing the rule of the most probable value: choose the hypothesis B i having the largest posterior probability, with the risk of error given by the sum of the probabilities of the hypotheses discarded (when one can formulate all such hypotheses)(the risk will be small only if this sum is small; it may be reasonable to group together several hypotheses having a total probability close to 1, without replaced by a more complicated one with the the alternative law being more global, including the old and the new parameters. To be precise, if the old law depends on parameters &OElig;l,..., &OElig;p, the new one will depend in addition on &OElig;p+l,&dquo;', aP+q and will reduce to the old one at given values of a P+1 , ... , aP+9 which can always be supposed to be equal to 0 (that is why the name &dquo;null hypothesis&dquo; is given to the assumption that the old law is valid). The maximum of P (EI&OElig; l &dquo;'&dquo; &OElig;p+q, K) when all the a i vary will be larger in general than its maximum when a P+1 = ... = ap + q = 0, hence, the rule of maximum likelihood will lead, almost always, to adopting the most complicated law. On the other hand, the usual criterion in this case is to investigate if there is not a great risk of error made by adopting the simplest law: to do this one can define a &dquo;deviation&dquo; between the observed results and those that would be expected, on average, from the simplest law, and then find the prior probability from such law of obtaining a deviation that is at least as large as the observed distance. It is convenient not to reject the simplest law unless this probability is very small. This is the principle of criteria based on &dquo;significant deviations&dquo;.
Hence, the simplest law benefits from a favorable prejudice, that is, of having a prior probability that is larger than that assigned to more (0), that is, cp' (0) and then that one can associate to every e an interval 9 0 -a and 9 0 + a such that the probability that provided that these quantities take values between 90 -a and 8 0 + 0 :: this will be attainable with probability tending to is then relative to a theoretical scheme deduced from reality by abstraction and simplification, and it will never be the limit of the observed frequencies.
What makes the theoretical scheme appealing is its convenience: with everything kept simple, it summarizes with sufficient precision the main aspects of an experiment, and it can be expressed through formulae that are simple and, at the same time, that allow making forecasts having a good precision.
As it has been stated by Mr. DARMOIS (2): &dquo;making a probability calculation in a specific case, requires seeing clearly all that it is necessary to know, such that the study follows closely the essential circumstances of the phenomenon considered&dquo;. Thus, the evaluation of a probability always results from a theoretical scheme permitting to assess, with more or less precision, the equal or unequal probability; it is completely legitimate, as stated by Mr Consider the case where the hypothesis to be examined concerns the value of a parameter B intervening in the probability law f (x, 0) taken for each observation x. Because the function f is supposed to be known, one can calculate, as a function of 0, the probability that the point 3 ;i,...,. T j B r falls in the critical region w. This probability, P (E c w[0) = 0 (0, w) is called &dquo;power function&dquo; of the criterion based on w. If the hypothesis H o to be examined attributes a value 0 0 to the parameter, the probability of a type-1 error calculated under hypothesis H o will be 0 (B o , w), and that of a type-2 error, calculated supposing that the true value is 0 1 will be (3 (()l, w) = 1 -(3 (()l, w). and it should be always kept in mind that f (x, B) may be inexact! Certainly, in general, we will be incapable of formulating precisely all alternatives to the validity of f (!, B), but it would be prudent to reserve a non-null prior probability for these alternatives, which will avoid a situation where f (x, 0) receives a brutal refutation in the case that, subsequently, the alternatives become more plausible and their posterior probabilities increase, at the expense of that of the former! As it has been said by CLAUDE BERNARD, we should not forget that the scientist must sacrifice as many theories as needed, &dquo;like the general that has had many horses killed but that still advances&dquo; .
